DISCRIMINATION AND THE ROBINSONPATMAN ACT*
MALCOLM P. SHARPt

THE

I

history of the anti-trust problem furnishes an aid to understanding the nature and importance of current treatments of
discrimination. Some features of this history may usefully be recalled at the present time.
The words "anti-trust" are a reminder that some early problems appeared to involve principally the form of business organization chosen by
great combinations of capital. In particular, we are apt to forget that it
was a decision of some importance and difficulty, that holding companies
were condemned by the Sherman Act. In the Northern Securities case in
19o4 Mr. Justice Holmes dissenting apparently thought that the holding
company there involved was about as much an individual, and as little a
combination, as "Mr. Morgan." In the same opinion Mr. Justice Holmes
indicates the doubt which he always entertained about severe construction of the anti-trust laws. His opinion is a classic expression of the view
that competition will take care of itself, if the way is open for newcomers
to enter an industry.
Since that decision there have been indications, in decrees at least, that
the concentration of control in the hands of natural persons might after
all amount to a combination in restraint of trade. It appears now that
any legal form which accomplishes the results condemned by the Acts
falls within their scope. Limits on the use of the holding company device
itself are indeed now proposed as a means of taking precautions against
the dangers to which corporate growth may lead.
A second great date is of course 1911. The rule of reason, then announced as the law, was later applied in the Steel and Harvester cases to
protect famous combinations. On the record in those cases, independents
appeared to control a very substantial share of production in the industries in question. Moreover the government failed, in the opinion of the
courts, adequately to prove the kind of price domination on the part of
* This paper was read at the Round Table on Commercial Law at the meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, December 29, 1937. A bibliography on the subject is collected in a recent note. 5i Harv. L. Rev. 694 (1938).
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the combinations there in question, which is commonly supposed in fact
to have existed.
The difficulties of proving the elimination of effective competition,
appeared dearly in the cases. It is now proposed, again as part of a precautionary program, to set specific limits on how far a group can go in
controlling named fractions of the production of any commodity.
In relation to such large problems of industrial organization, the problem of discrimination must find its place. As a result of the great Pittsburgh Plus proceeding, and subsequent discussion of the problem which
that raised, there has been a tendency in some quarters to identify the
problem of competition or monopoly with the problem of discrimination.
It appears to be said that monopoly is always discriminatory and that discrimination is always monopolistic; and that if only discrimination can
be controlled, this will solve the problem of monopoly.
As will appear from what follows, I myself as an amateur, am convinced by what reading of economists I have done, that this is not the
case. Differentiation and discrimination are often very difficult to distinguish; and even when one has spotted discrimination, it seems to me
often to appear in highly competitive situations. If this is so, it is a matter
of some importance for the conservation of industrial, legislative and administrative energy.
II
We may approach the subject rather indirectly by considering the
difficulties which efforts to eliminate the worst kind of discrimination,
may create. Secret discrimination was treated as an evil throughout the
opinions of the District Court and the Supreme Court in the recent Sugar
Institute case., In view of the evils of secret discrimination, an industry's
non-anonymous open price system, without a waiting period, was held
legal by the courts. Secrets about concessions cannot of course be kept if
prices are in fact public.
First consider the familiar dangers of such an open price system. A
limit on secret discrimination is apt to be thought of as a limit on all
discrimination; and when this step is taken, the troublesome line between
differentiation and discrimination has to be drawn. In a doubtful case this
line will be drawn by business men in the interest of their profits. Quantity discounts in fact related to cost have even been attacked as discriminatory by sponsors of open price systems.
Again open prices, whether in the sugar industry or in retail stores,
x297 U.S.
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exert some pressure against the price cutter. If his cut becomes promptly
known, it will be promptly met. He may thus have gained little volume
and "spoiled" his own market. In view of this danger he will of course
hesitate to cut prices.
Again price cutters are apt to be regarded by their fellows in the trade
as destructive and unethical personalities. Social pressure against price
cutting is thus built up. It is said that one price-cutter, of national reputation, after a particularly effective cut, found it agreeable to take a vacation abroad rather than have to talk to his fellow executives. However
this may be, the social pressure resulting in the case of known cuts has
been generally recognized; and is a reason for what was thought by some
to be an insistence on anonymity in the trade association cases prior to
the Sugar case.
Again the difficulty of enforcing gentlemen's agreements as a business
matter, is probably a great though imponderable aid to the government
in its efforts to enforce the anti-trust laws. It is plain that gentlemen's
agreements will be at once promoted and made more effective by any
device which makes it easier to detect their violation.
In view of all of these objections to an open price system, it may be
said that they ought not to be permitted except under supervision by
specialized government experts observing their effect in each industry;
and it is pointed out that no such specialized supervision exists in the case
of most open price agreements.
On the other hand, as a device to prevent secret discrimination, there
are considerations which weigh in favor of flexible open price systems.
Secret discriminations commonly depend on and invite fraud in the
simple sense of lying. Sellers who grant secret concessions lie to buyers
who do not get them. Buyers are tempted to lie to sellers about concessions which they claim to have been offered. The inquisitive salesman
trying to see the papers on his customer's desk is a familiar figure in some
trades.
As Mr. Eugene Grace is reported to have said, at a time when the
national administration was helping him with his business, the steel
trade in the absence of an open price system has all the characteristics of
an oriental bazaar. A lusty individualism, like that of Mr. Justice
Holmes, may not be overanxious about a certain admixture of commercial
fraud. But on the whole we all of us object to it more or less.
In the second place informed sellers and buyers are supposed to be
necessary features of an orderly and classically competitive market. It is
apparent that secret discrimination defeats information.
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Moreover, an open price system if carefully scrutinized may furnish
useful information about competitive conditions in an industry. Leads
and lags in price changes, the presence of greater or smaller extras charges,
and the persistence of geographical differentials are examples of phenomena which may appear clearly in open price filings.
Again the experience of open price associations and their executives
may lead eventually to constructive steps on the part of industry and
credit institutions for alleviating some of the ill effects of booms and
crises.
As far as the necessity of supervision goes, it is to be hoped that
gradually a staff of qualified experts is being developed in the Trade
Commission and the Department of Commerce, who will be capable of
understanding the phenomena disclosed by open price systems, and protecting the public against the abuse of such systems.
On a balance I myself should be in favor of such limited efforts to
eliminate secret discriminations as are exemplified by flexible open price
systems. It may be that this judgment reflects only an attitude toward
competition which has been described by Dr. Homey as one feature of
"the neurotic personality of our time." If so, the significance of the reaction would still require further consideration. I am of course inclined myself to think that this judgment reflects some more "rational" process.
But it would take a large book to defend such a thesis; and I do not propose to do it here.
Moreover, I should insist again that the development of open price
systems imperatively requires the parallel development of adequate administrative observation and supervision. A large element in the prices
of steel products consists of charges which are described as extras, items
added to quoted base prices, and often aggregating more than base prices.
Each company has its own voluminous and intricate extras book. The
members of the industry engaged under the steel code in efforts to make
extras uniform. Some of these efforts, going back to the inspiration of
Mr. Hoover's work as Secretary of Commerce, were doubtless scientific
and useful. Various observers have, however, noted a tendency on the
part of members of the industry in cases of doubt to revise extras upward.
The publicity given to extras books, plus an open price system, puts
the members of the industry in a strategic position to exert vigorous upward pressure on prices. It would take a very unusual expert, perhaps
better qualified than any single expert in the steel industry, to understand
and check the industry's entire extras policy. Nevertheless, there should
be somewhere in the government a group which invites protests from
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customers, and which is equipped to protect protesting customers from
retaliation, in cases of prejudice resulting from extras practices. Such a
group might be in the Department of Commerce; but it would seem more
appropriate that it should be associated with a group in the Trade Commission specializing on the study of the effects of the steel industry's
present open price practices. This is only one example of the need for
scrutiny and supervision on the part of administrative officers.
III
With considerations pro and con so nicely balanced, when it is a question of preventing only secret discrimination, it must be apparent that
to me, at any rate, the problem of efforts to eliminate all discrimination is
even more troublesome. In fact the objections to open price systems are
multiplied and the advantages divided when it comes to efforts to eliminate discrimination generally which stop short of the creation for each
major industry of something like an Interstate Commerce Commission.
It will be recalled indeed that the original Interstate Commerce Act was
directed primarily toward the elimination of discrimination by railroads,
and not to the maintenance of reasonable rates.
It has been thought by some that the Robins6n-Patman Act inaugurated an effort to eliminate all commercial discrimination. I myself on
the other hand am in substantial agreement with Professor McLaughlin's
argument that the words about competition and monopoly in the new Act
let in the rule of reason embodied both in the Sherman Act and in other,
supplementary anti-trust Acts.2
It seems to me further, as Mr. McLaughlin says in other words, that
differentiation must be sharply distinguished from discrimination; and
that anything which may legitimately be called mere differentiation, will
not under any circumstances come within the condemnation of the new
Act. Differentiation means variations in practice suited to variations in
circumstances. Discrimination means variations in practice in the same
circumstances.
Even in the railroad industry, under the elaborate supervision provided for by the Interstate Commerce Act, designed in the first instance
to prevent discrimination, considerable differentiation is still allowed.
Market equalization by differentiation may still be permitted.3 Special
rates on products subject to fabrication in transit are "mildly discriminaaMcLaughlin, The Courts and the Robinson-Patman Act, 4 Law and Contem. Prob. 410

(1937).
3U.S. v. C.M. & St.P.R.R., 294 U.S. 499 (935). Compare Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v.
See Mansfield, The Lake Cargo Coal Rate Controversy (1932).
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tory," but they have been permitted from an early date. 4 The long and
short haul clause authorizes relief from its strict provisions, perhaps primarily to enable carriers by rail to meet competition.
Thus it seems likely, both as a matter of first impression and as a
matter of experience, that a careful distinction will have to be made
between legitimate differentiation and discrimination.
The proceedings under the Robinson-Patman Act which are now most
in the public eye further illustrate the necessity for this distinction. These
proceedings are attacks on what the Trade Commission describes as basing point practices in the cast iron soil pipe and cement industries. While
there are perhaps elements of basing point practice in the cement industry, involved in the more important of the two cases, the Commission has
extended its attack to include all delivered price practices as well.
A basing point system is one whereby prices are named for products at
specific points other than mill locations and billed to include freight from
these points to points where the products are taken and used by buyers.
A delivered price system is of course simply a system of quotation and
billing f. o. b. the buyer's location.
The classical example of a basing point system was Pittsburgh plus;
and the multiple basing point system now in vogue in the steel industry
has been more recently the system most commonly discussed.
Superficially any basing point system involves an element of discrimination. The producer may, it appears, add freight from a remote basing
point to a point freight-wise nearer his location. If he sells at the basing
point, the result will accordingly be a greater net yield on products sold

nearer home than on products sold farther away. It is further argued by
some that such "discrimination" is necessarily a mark of monopoly; since
each sale must bear its equal share of "costs"; and the sales nearer home
must thus be considerably above costs; and so above normal and competitive price.
On examination the argument appears dubious.
A producer or group of producers may not produce any excess beyond
the needs of their local market; may not sell at the basing point at all, and
the practice may be merely an accounting one. In some situations this is
the fact. A single producer may have an advantage of location which in
the absence of competition at that location he could hardly be expected
to give up.
4 Central R.R. Co. V. U.S., 257 U.S. 247 (1921); Union Wire Rope Corp. v. Atchison, T. &
S.F.R.R. Co., 66 F. (2)965 (C.C.A. 8th 1933), cerl. den., 290 U.S. 686 (I933). See Report of
National Recovery Administration on the Operation of the Basing Point System in the Iron
and Steel Industry 93-97 (1935).
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But apart from these odd cases, it is further true that even a group of
competing producers, producing an excess beyond the needs of their local
market and so selling in remote areas, will have advantages of location in
their nearby markets. It will cost their competitors something to get into
those markets; and it is to be expected that they will take advantage of
the fact.
Their advantage is indeed in the nature of rent. It could be eliminated
by sufficiently intense competition, a strong buyers' combination, or a
government order, which would give all advantages of location to buyers.
These advantages would perhaps be passed on to ultimate consumers;
and that of course would be a good thing. It would, however, be the
same sort of gain as that which would result from the abolition of all rent.
There is a less geometrically theoretical and more serious practical
difficulty with the argument for a uniform mill net yield. Charging the
home folks more than the foreigners may yield a "freight profit" to a mill.
It may on the other hand occasion net "freight loss." In either case it may
be expressed as "freight absorption." This freight absorption is apt to be
designed to enable the mill to sell in remote markets in competition with
mills located nearer those remote markets.
If freight absorption were eliminated some uneconomical cross-hauling
would doubtless be prevented. There are nowhere any good dollars and
cents figures on the wastes of cross-hauling in any industry. Even the
Trade Commission's old figures for the cement industry were vitiated by
failure to consider the quantities of production at various sources of
supply. In other industries small differences in product classifications add
a difficulty to examination of the problem. Assuming, however, as is perhaps the fact, that the wastes of cross-hauling are considerable, it is not
at all clear that their elimination would be worth the cost, to both mills
and buyers, of destroying the competition which mills offer in markets
remote from their location.
It is to be observed that the argument for a uniform mill net yield on
all prices takes no account of differences between fixed and variable costs.
All that the most rigorous classical theory should require, however, is that
shipments to remote markets, netting less than shipments to nearer
markets, should bear their share of variable costs with perhaps a little
over as some contribution to the payment of fixed costs.
In any event it is probable that a uniform mill net yield, if it could be
obtained at all, would have to be enforced by a scheme which could only
be described as price-fixing. Such a scheme would run into serious admin-
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istrative difficulties which are only partly reflected in a decision that an
effort completely to eliminate discrimination violates due process of law.,
With all these qualifications, it remains true that basing point practice
may under some circumstances be objectionable. It may open the way for
the collection of monopolistic "phantom freights," "freight profits," going
beyond the rent which results normally from advantages of location, by
producers remote from basing points. It may mask a system of freight
absorption, perhaps on the part of producers located anywhere, which is
objectionable on the same grounds as the classic underselling practices of
the old Standard Oil trust. It may reflect a fear on the part of producers
located remote from basing points, that if they start cutting prices to
nearby customers, they will find themselves in a dangerous price war.
These objections may be real. The more sensational charges against
basing point practices as such seem more dubious. A basing point system
may indeed greatly facilitate the use of an open price system, by making
normal price quotations mean something. A producer who is fixing mill
or delivered prices to meet competition from anywhere will have some
difficulty in posting a price that means much. So far as basing point practice supports unduly rigid open price systems, it is to this extent objectionable.
But the further charge that basing point practice whenever it appears
is the great mark of sensational monopoly seems quite unwarranted. The
most striking basing point practice now in operation, though not the most
famous, is that in the automobile industry. Though competition in the
automobile industry may be peculiar, it may also be more or less effective.
In the steel industry, whose multiple basing point practice has attracted
so much attention, one curious contrast has seldom been noted. Of all the
steel products sold on a basing point basis, sheets have the fewest basing
points. Nevertheless, sheets include some of the products sold to the automobile industry, whose prices fluctuate in as competitive a fashion as
anyone could wish; and in whose sale vigorous sellers' competition apparently obtains. On the other hand steel rails, whose rigid but perhaps
not very profitable price is a by-word, are not sold on a basing point basis.
This is doubtless a coincidence. Tin plate is perhaps the outstanding example in the industry of prices which are both rigid and profitable; and
tin plate is sold on a basing point basis. At the same time the comparison
is a warning against identifying monopoly with basing points.
In dealing with a phenomenon of this complexity, both the steel industry and the Trade Commission have taken extreme positions. Offered a
solution designed to introduce some flexibility into basing point practice
sFairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S.

i (1927).
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without unduly upsetting its established methods of doing business, the
Steel Institute and its lawyers indulged in specious defenses of every
feature of the industry's practices. For example the practice of charging
rail freight on inland water shipments has been defended by high sounding
but absurd talk about fair competition. The one real argument for the
practice, based on the necessity for giving customers protection against
erratically fluctuating rate schedules, has not been publicly stressed. This
is perhaps because if this argument were sufficiently pressed, it could be
taken care of by those responsible for barge line policies. While the tonnage affected is relatively small, the practice and its defense are glaring
examples of the extent to which the industry obstinately clings to its
habits.
On the other hand, the Trade Commission and its lawyers have clung
tenaciously to the geometry of the uniform mill net yield theory. They
have not hesitated indeed to argue in opposite directions at the same time,
insisting that both freight absorption and systematic efforts to limit it are
objectionable on the ground that they are monopolistic.
Between two extremes, a member of the public should naturally prefer
that of the Trade Commission. For one thing, while the industry's theory
if extended might produce serious results, there seems to be no possibility
whatever that the Trade Commission could enforce its theory in its simple
and primitive form. Moreover in attempting to enforce its theory, it is
likely that the Trade Commission will exert a pressure in the direction of
developments required by the public interest.
Thus the present proceedings against basing point and delivered price
practices indicate a legitimate and desirable function of the RobinsonPatman Act. As has been said, basing point practice in its extreme form,
whether resulting in net freight profits or net freight losses, has objectionable features. These objectionable features come properly under the heading of monopoly and discrimination. Moreover efforts to curb them are
not open to the objection that efforts to extend open price practice meet.
In attempting to discourage discrimination, open price systems and similar devices may contribute seriously to objectionable rigidities. On the
other hand, it is difficult to see how an attack on basing point and delivered price practices can of itself intensify such rigidities.
Thus extreme forms of basing point practice may well be attacked under the Robinson-Patman Act. It seems desirable that this attack should
be more discriminating than some recent anti-trust proceedings. For
example, it was found in 1934 that only about six percent of the capacity
of the United States Steel Corporation for manufacturing steel code
products was more than fifty miles from an existing applicable basing
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point; while forty-four percent of such capacity of the Bethlehem Cor-

poration was more than fifty miles from an applicable basing point.6
Conditions of supply and demand may indeed explain at least some of
this feature of Bethlehem's practices. Moreover, in so far as this is not
the case, a number of possible explanations of motive would need to be
considered. Is Bethlehem interested in freight profits, afraid of a price
war, or merely concerned not to introduce uneasiness in the trade? In any
event the figures suggest prima facie the possibility that a proceeding
against Bethlehem would be more effective than a proceeding against the
entire industry.
In so far as pending proceedings against the cement industry are
directed to the elimination not only of basing point practice but of delivered price practice generally, they suggest what may well be a useful
policy in dealing with geographical discriminations and near discriminations. A delivered price system is, as has been said, not the same thing
as a basing point system. It is, however, an essential element in a smoothly organized basing point system. The prohibition of delivered prices contained in the Wheeler Bill would thus be an attack on basing point practice at a fairly vital point. It would be directed against a phenomenon
more easy to observe and recognize than the somewhat problematical
monopolistic discrimination which has thus far been the basis of attacks
on basing point systems. Combined with a somewhat revised RobinsonPatman Act, the enactment of the Wheeler Bill would seem to furnish the

best solution available, apart at least from a degree of government regulation.
If what has been said about the uniform net yield theory is true, it
follows that in the new scheme of legislation considerable latitude of
freight absorption must be allowed producers. Thus far this allowance
has been justified under the heading of differentiation "in good faith to
meet competition"; or, as in the Robinson-Patman Act, "in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor ....... Practically strengthened
by the enactment of the Wheeler Bill, the Robinson-Patman Act would
still condemn freight profits and freight absorption in so far as they reflect
or encourage monopoly, and in so far as they are in a proper sense discriminatory.
With freight absorption thus limited, and delivered prices prohibited,
one real practical difficulty remains, and another specious practical difficulty will be urged.
, The specious difficulty which industry will insist upon may first be disposed of. It is indeed true that if the reform of basing point practice were
6Report, op. cit. supra note 4, at 43.
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to do at once all that the enthusiasts wish, there would be considerable
danger of serious and rather unpredictable dislocation among the users,
fabricators, and sellers of such products as steel. Though a Toledo buyer
might gain a lower price on some products by the creation of a new basing
point at Detroit, his Detroit competitors might gain so much more that
the result would be to destroy the relationship between prices on which
the Toledo buyer's business depends for its existence. Inasmuch as the
present system has at any rate been tolerated for many years by the
government, the Toledo buyer in question has some reason to urge that he
should at least be given some time to make the necessary adjustments. It
is to be noticed that in the case put, the buyer is not necessarily one who
is not performing an economic function, who is simply trying to hold his
place against improvements in method, like some distributors. He is performing an economic function at a location 6hosen partly because the
government has at least tolerated existing price differentials7
The answer to the argument based on such cases, is an answer also to
those who make extreme claims for the possibility of great and striking
advantages by the quick elimination of basing point practice. Members
of the steel industry have not always found it necessary promptly to make
use of new basing points formally established by posting low base prices
at such points. There is reason to suppose that producers will be able by
maintaining existing geographical differentials, at least temporarily, to
protect customers in the position of the Toledo buyer just referred to.
The danger of unforeseen dislocations is indeed greater in a depression
than in good times. It is to be remembered that fears of such dislocation
at the time of the Pittsburgh plus order, proved groundless.
The other difficulty of the proposed new scheme of control would be
serious, if it could not be provided against. A relatively low price f.o.b.
mill might be designed to enable a producer to make some profit over
variable costs while developing business in remote markets. It would thus
be neither monopolistic nor discriminatory but a differentiation for the
purpose of "meeting" competition. Experience has indicated, however,
that buyers in nearby markets would be alert to find ways to take advantage of this lower price for their own purposes. A product would be
sold ostensibly destined for a remote market; but it would in fact be
diverted to a nearby market, where it could be sold at a considerable price
advantage. 8
At present in some instances diversion of this sort is prevented in part
by agreements with carriers, supplemented by retention of the kind of
control that is associated with "title" on the part of sellers. Traditionally
7Id.

at 78-87.

8Id. at 97-98.
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the seller retains "title" under a delivered price system until delivery at
the point of destination.
It is not clear that the magic of title makes any real difference in the
effectiveness of agreements between shippers and carriers, with respect to
diversions. Agreements to control diversions might be effective in any
event. At the same time, if the state of title to goods has any magical consequences in such cases, it would be quite easy for a seller to retain "security title" by taking bills of lading running to his own order His security title would secure the buyer's observance of the parties' arrangements that the buyer is to have the benefit of low prices and freight absorption only on goods actually reaching the remote market. The use of
such bills of lading might be made effective with, and perhaps even without, the intervention of banking services
The effect of diversions in creating real discrimination, or something
like it, in nearby markets, suggests that such an arrangement would be not
only permissible but required by the scheme of legislation in question.
The price differentiation in favor of remote buyers would perhaps be
legitimate if, and only if, it were in fact used to "meet competition" in
the remote market, and not to give an irregular advantage in a nearby
market.
It may be that the necessity or desirability of controlling diversion
should be recognized by explicit provisions in any new legislative scheme.
A simple legislative enactment requiring truck and water carriers in interstate commerce, as well as railroads, to observe agreements with respect to diversion, would perhaps be the simplest solution of this question.
IV
After a great deal of study and uncertainty we may thus be on the way
to a healthy solution of the problem of secret discrimination and open
prices; and the other most troublesome problem of open discrimination,
the problem resulting from such practices as basing point arrangements,
and from the geographical "imperfections" of competition generally.
A final word on perspective may be in order. It will have been noticed
that it seems possible to overestimate both the significance of discrimination and the practical possibility of controlling it. A considerable amount
of discrimination, and perhaps even fraud, may be the price we pay for the
elements of competition which persist in our industrial system. Moreover
even if we were to turn to the most rigid regulation, the history of railroads suggests that it would be impossible even then entirely to eliminate
practices which are at least close to the line between differentiation and
discrimination.
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It seems likely that the questions with which those who originally attacked the trust problem first concerned themselves will prove more important than the problem of discrimination. It is theoretically possible
that a greater use than has yet been made of the notion of "conspiracy"
would lead to an intelligible and relatively severe meaning of that word
as used in the Sherman Act. The development of such a meaning would
perhaps do something to counteract the ill effects which may have resulted from the rule of reason. An intent at any time amounting to something more than an idle dream, and accompanied by overt acts, all directed toward gaining advantages dependent entirely upon the elimination of competition, might prove to be the meaning of conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Such a definition would be significant, however, only in criminal proceedings. It would retain considerable vagueness. And if it is desirable to
return to the policy which the Supreme Court at first thought embodied
in the Sherman Act, it is proper to do so by dearly defined legislation.
Legislation condemning industrial holding companies and specifically
limiting the share of production of any commodity which any group
might control would serve the purpose. It seems likely that such legislation
would have much more effect than efforts to deal with the problem of
monopoly by eliminating discrimination. The injustice of monopoly price
requires vigorous precautions; whatever its significance in the large interactions of economic forces.
It may be appropriate to observe finally that the importance of the
whole problem of monopoly is perhaps being overestimated. The most
serious objections to bigness are psychological and political. There are
also serious administrative problems which must be solved by a great
corporation, lest it remain "too big too long." Monopoly price yields nonfunctional, unearned returns, unjust enrichment. Moreover it is likely
that a great trust-busting campaign will have some effect on price rigidities; though it seems to me that the practical possibility of substantial
effect has been overestimated.
On the other side it must be remembered that great areas of economic
activity, and serious economic problems, may be left almost or wholly
untouched by such a campaign.
The curse of smallness is now referred to less commonly than the "curse
of bigness." Anyone, however, who will reflect on the farmers, the miners
of bituminous coal, the producers of crude oil, clothing and cotton cloth
manufacturers, and lumber mills, will be reminded that the problems in
these industries are of a different order from the problems in the anthracite
industry, in oil refining, in automobiles, steel, and rails.
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Again it has been observed recently by many that the labor policies of
some of our relatively small employers have been less enlightened than
the policies, for example, of the United States Steel Corporation. I know
there is a theory that the Steel Corporation is playing a Machiavellian
game; but my observation leads me to doubt this theory. The position of
General Motors is more ambiguous.
Again, recognizing the evils of monopolistic practices, one must also
recognize that cumulatively a large share of these evils occur in connection
with practices in local communities which it is difficult for any government
to reach. One who has over a period of some months watched a state commission struggle conscientiously and intelligently over a local lumber yard
monopoly, has a vivid sense of the extent to which serious monopolistic
rigidities tend to be immune from effective government attack. While
bituminous coal prices, textile prices, and lumber mills' prices were hopelessly demoralized by cut-throat competition, one found local groups of
middlemen in many localities engaged in efforts to maintain prices which
were difficult to prove and cumulatively seemed almost to defy effective
governmental treatment.
At this point also Mr. Justice Holmes' sturdy Manchester confidence
in the vitality of competitive instincts needs to be remembered. The local
situations to which I refer have probably as their most effective check the
fear of newcomers and substitutes; which may operate apart from, though
in aid of, governmental efforts.
In the great front page major monopolies, so far as I have been able to
observe them; there are more effective "natural" checks than the cartoonist always recognizes. I have seen the mention of "scrappies" produce
what appeared to be genuine and unsynthetic fear on the faces of great
captains of our copper mining industry. The progress of independents in
the steel industry appears to have been more or less authentic and inexorable.
Again, as an amateur economist, it seems to me that there is little that
could fairly be called monopoly in the forces producing many of our rigid
prices. I have heard an intelligent small town banker criticize retail merchants in his community for not cutting the price of men's shirts during
the depression. Here is an open price effect which perhaps has something
to do with what the economists tell us about the lag in adjustment of
retail prices.
Again I have heard the same banker attacked by one of his friends, and
admitting the justice of the attack, with respect to high interest rates on
mortgage loans. In fact the inflexibility of interest charges and interest
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rates has generally been recognized as of first-rate importance. Thus it
seems to me possible that the rigid though apparently not very profitable
price of steel rails had less to do with railroad purchases during the depression than the fixed interest charges which railroads were trying to carry.
This illustration suggests a further and very important possible limitation on trust-busting as a panacea. Casual observers and some students
have come to think that rigid prices of some steel products, for example,
are the cause or a principal cause of the instability of steel operations.
Against these observers many of the steel executives insist that there is a
marked negative elasticity in the demand for their products. I use elasticity in a rough sense, and mean that a declining market greatly discourages
buyers while a rising market greatly stimulates them. In fact no one
knows enough to say anything whatever with confidence about any such
cause and effect relationships. It seems, from rough experience, very unlikely that elasticity of demand for some steel products is anywhere near
as great as some people have thought. Would a greater reduction in structural steel prices have led to heavy skyscraper building during the depression? It seems most unlikely.
Rigidities should indeed be discouraged and unexpected good results
may follow. The experience of electric power rates is an example of how
fruitful experiment in this direction may prove. So, the price policy of the
steel industry in 1934 and 1937, dependent perhaps less on monopoly than

on irrational cost-price and boom reactions, is an example of practices to
be avoided and prevented. Just a year ago, in a paper at an American
Statistical Association round table, I warned against the repetition of the
1934 experience which has since taken place in steel.
At the same time it seems likely, as some of our most careful observers
are saying, that the production of cement and steel and similar products
is at the mercy of a rhythm in the production of "durable goods" which
proceeds quite independently of purchasing power, speculation, and perhaps even war. The relation of the present recession to a rhythm in automobile production and financing suggests the larger significance of similar
long-time rhythms. Had last winter's boom continued upward, there
would doubtless soon be an urgent necessity for checking it. The fluctuation in durable goods production seems to me at any rate the major problem which our industrial society faces. The most promising lead for its
solution seems to me, not trust-busting, but the development of an orderly
system of private and public credit facilities for durable goods industries;
and particularly a unified and orderly mortgage banking and construction
finance system.

